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p64_utils/cy_p64_psacrypto_values.h

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/**
* \file cy_p64_psacrypto_values.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values.
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include cy_p64_psacrypto.h.
*
* This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze
* values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys,
* designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by
* the library.
*
* This header file only defines preprocessor macros.
*
* Copyright 2019-2022 Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (an Infineon company)
*
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* (http)www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#ifndef CY_P64_CY_P64_PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
#define CY_P64_CY_P64_PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
#include "cy_p64_syscall.h"
/** \addtogroup psacrypto_error
* @{
*/
/* PSA error codes */
/** Macro to simplify the creation of PSA error code constants */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(error) ((cy_p64_psa_status_t)(CY_P64_INVALID \
| ((uint32_t)(error) & (~CY_P64_SYSCALL_MASK))))
/** The action was completed successfully. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_SUCCESS ((cy_p64_psa_status_t)0xA0000000u)
/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined
* failure cause.
*
* Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard
* error codes are applicable. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-132))
/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported
* by this implementation.
*
* Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration
* parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized.
* If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as
* not valid, return #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-134))
/** The requested action is denied by a policy.
*
* Implementations should return this error code when the parameters
* are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly
* denies the requested operation.
*
* If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a
* forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are
* not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function
* returns #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or
* #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-133))
/** The output buffer is too small.
*
* Applications can call the \c CY_P64_PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function
* description to determine a sufficient buffer size.
*
* Implementations should preferably return this error code only
* in cases when performing the operation with a larger output
* buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this
* error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition
* to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-138))
/** Asking for an item that already exists
*
* Implementations should return this error, when attempting
* to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-139))
/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist.
*
* Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like
* a key) does not exist. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-140))
/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state.
*
* Multipart operations return this error when one of the
* functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function
* descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions.
*
* Implementations will not return this error code to indicate
* that a key either exists or not,
* but instead return #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
* as applicable.
*
* Implementations will not return this error code to indicate that a
* key handle is invalid, but return #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* instead. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-137))
/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid.
*
* Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or
* combination of parameters are recognized as invalid.
*
* Implementations will not return this error code to indicate that a
* key handle is invalid, but return #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* instead.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-135))
/** There is not enough runtime memory.
*
* If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this
* error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-141))
/** There is not enough persistent storage.
*
* Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if
* there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition,
* many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this
* error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for
* the requested action and the log storage space is full. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-142))
/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation.
*
* This can indicate a communication failure between the application
* and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and
* an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure
* may be transient or permanent depending on the cause.
*
* \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined
* whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations
* should return #CY_P64_PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever
* possible, however functions may return #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* if the requested action was completed successfully in an external
* cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before
* the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-145))
/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss.
*
* This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted.
* It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory
* (use #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error
* between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use
* #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is
* in a valid state but is full (use #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE).
*
* Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was
* previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no
* longer be readable from storage.
*
* When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure
* the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global
* integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other
* data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but
* its integrity cannot be guaranteed.
*
* Implementations should only use this error code to report a
* permanent storage corruption. However application writers should
* keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be
* reported using this error code. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-146))
/** A hardware failure was detected.
*
* A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the
* cause. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-147))
/** A tampering attempt was detected.
*
* If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee
* that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains
* confidential. Applications should not perform any security function
* and should enter a safe failure state.
*
* Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid
* state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates
* that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending
* on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals,
* the implementation may forcibly terminate the application.
*
* This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach
* is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still
* protected. Implementations shall only return this error code
* to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that
* the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed,
* or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now
* considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code
* to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to
* perform the requested operation (use #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE,
* #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE,
* #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code
* instead).
*
* This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations
* shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of
* the application itself. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-151))
/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed
* for the requested action.
*
* This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator.
* Application writers should note that this error can be returned not
* only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such
* as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute
* an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that
* use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure
* to certain attacks.
*
* Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init()
* has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient
* entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically
* secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return
* this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded
* during normal operation. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-148))
/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect.
*
* Verification functions return this error if the verification
* calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified
* was determined to be incorrect.
*
* If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return
* either #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-149))
/** The decrypted padding is incorrect.
*
* \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that
* the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding
* is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer
* protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain
* encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of
* unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not
* to reveal whether the padding is invalid.
*
* Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding
* as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer.
* In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not
* depend on the validity of the padding. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-150))
/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting
* to read from a resource. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-143))
/** The key handle is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE (CY_P64_PSA_ERROR(-136))
/**@}*/
/** \addtogroup crypto_types
* @{
*/
/** An invalid key type value.
*
* Zero is not the encoding of any key type.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x0000)
/** Vendor-defined key type flag.
*
* Key types defined by this standard will never have the
* #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types
* must use an encoding with the #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should
* respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x8000)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x7000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x1000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x2000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x4000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x7000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x3000)
/** \endcond */
/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined.
*
* See also #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \
(((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes.
*
* This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \
(((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \
((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC)
/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \
(((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \
& ~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \
CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
(((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public
* part. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \
(((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR)
/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type.
*
* You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
*
* \param type A public key type or key pair type.
*
* \return The corresponding key pair type.
* If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
* the return value is undefined.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
((type) | CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type.
*
* You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
*
* \param type A public key type or key pair type.
*
* \return The corresponding public key type.
* If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
* the return value is undefined.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \
((type) & ~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
/** Raw data.
*
* A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation.
* Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x1001)
/** HMAC key.
*
* The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be
* used for.
*
* HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x1100)
/** A secret for key derivation.
*
* The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
* can be used for.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x1200)
/** A key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.
*
* The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or
* 32 bytes (AES-256).
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x2400)
/** A key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).
*
* The size of the key can be 8 bytes (single DES), 16 bytes (2-key 3DES) or
* 24 bytes (3-key 3DES).
*
* Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly
* deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES
* is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x2301)
/** A key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
* Camellia block cipher. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x2403)
/** A key for the RC4 stream cipher.
*
* Note that RC4 is weak and deprecated and should only be used in
* legacy protocols. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x2002)
/** A key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
*
* ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539.
*
* Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces,
* and should reject other sizes.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x2004)
/** RSA public key. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x4001)
/** RSA key pair (private and public key). */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x7001)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \
(CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x4100)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x7100)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x00ff)
/** \endcond */
/** Elliptic curve key pair.
*
* \param curve A value of type ::cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t that
* identifies the ECC curve to be used.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \
(CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve))
/** Elliptic curve public key.
*
* \param curve A value of type ::cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t that
* identifies the ECC curve to be used.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
(CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve))
/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \
((CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \
~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \
(((type) & ~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \
CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
(((type) & ~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \
CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \
((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) (CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \
((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \
0))
/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
/** SEC random curves over prime fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
/** SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
/** Size-specific elliptic curve. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 (CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)
/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
/** SEC random curves over binary fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curve:
* sect163r2.
* It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
/** Brainpool P random curves.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1,
* brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1.
* It is defined in RFC 5639.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
/** Curve25519 and Curve448.
*
* This family comprises the following Montgomery curves:
* - 255-bit: Bernstein et al.,
* _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006.
* The algorithm #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve.
* - 448-bit: Hamburg,
* _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
* The algorithm #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((cy_p64_psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x4200)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x7200)
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_key_type_t)0x00ff)
#define CY_P64_PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \
(((type) >> 8) & 7)
/** \endcond */
/** Diffie-Hellman key pair.
*
* \param group A value of type ::cy_p64_psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
* Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \
(CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group))
/** Diffie-Hellman public key.
*
* \param group A value of type ::cy_p64_psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
* Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \
(CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group))
/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \
((CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \
~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \
(((type) & ~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \
CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
(((type) & ~CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \
CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \
((cy_p64_psa_dh_family_t) (CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \
((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \
0))
/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A.
*
* This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits):
* 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support
* all of these sizes or only a subset.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((cy_p64_psa_dh_family_t) 0x03)
/** The block size of a block cipher.
*
* \param type A cipher key type (value of type #cy_p64_psa_key_type_t).
*
* \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher.
* The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported
* cipher key type.
*
* \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block
* cipher, for example CTR mode (#CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CTR).
* This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be
* used to determine the size of the data that #cy_p64_psa_cipher_update()
* might buffer for future processing in general.
*
* \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
*
* \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(type) \
(((type) & CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
1u << CY_P64_PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \
0u)
/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag.
*
* Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG
* bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with
* the #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure
* used by standard encodings whenever practical.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x80000000u)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x7f000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x02000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x06000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x10000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x12000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x20000000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x30000000)
/** \endcond */
/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined.
*
* See also #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption
* with associated data (AEAD) algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm,
* also known as public-key signature algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm,
* also known as public-key encryption algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
/** MASK */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff)
/** MD2 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MD2 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000001)
/** MD4 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MD4 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000002)
/** MD5 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MD5 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000003)
/** CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000004)
/** SHA1 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000005)
/** SHA2-224 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000008)
/** SHA2-256 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000009)
/** SHA2-384 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000a)
/** SHA2-512 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000b)
/** SHA2-512/224 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000c)
/** SHA2-512/256 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000d)
/** SHA3-224 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000010)
/** SHA3-256 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000011)
/** SHA3-384 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000012)
/** SHA3-512 */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x01000013)
/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm.
*
* This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy
* for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key
* may then be used to perform operations using the same signature
* algorithm parametrized with any supported hash.
*
* That is, suppose that `CY_P64_PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros:
* - #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS,
* - #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.
* Then you may create and use a key as follows:
* - Set the key usage field using #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example:
* ```
* psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); or VERIFY
* psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, CY_P64_PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
* ```
* - Import or generate key material.
* - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing
* an algorithm built from `CY_P64_PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each
* call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash.
* ```
* psa_sign_hash(handle, CY_P64_PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...);
* psa_sign_hash(handle, CY_P64_PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...);
* psa_sign_hash(handle, CY_P64_PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...);
* ```
*
* This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are
* parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build
* an algorithm \c alg, #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true.
*
* This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to
* perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x010000ff)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x00c00000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x02800000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define CY_P64_PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 8
/** \endcond */
/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm.
*
* For example, #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HMAC(#CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm.
*
* HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \
(((alg) & (CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE)
/** In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to
* CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is
* truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm,
* whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can
* reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation
* to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation
* is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x00003f00)
/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm.
*
* A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC
* algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm
* consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value
* for the untruncated algorithm.
*
* \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that
* are not valid, either because the specified length is larger
* than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is
* smaller than permitted by the implementation.
*
* \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that
* is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated
* algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm
* for policy comparison purposes.
*
* \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
* #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t such that #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg)
* is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
* MAC algorithm.
* \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
* This must be at most the full length of the MAC
* and must be at least an implementation-specified
* minimum. The implementation-specified minimum
* shall not be zero.
*
* \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified
* length.
* \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
* MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or
* too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \
(((mac_alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) | \
((mac_length) << CY_P64_PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK))
/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated
* MAC algorithm.
*
* \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
* #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t such that #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg)
* is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
* MAC algorithm.
*
* \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
* MAC algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \
((mac_alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)
/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated.
*
* \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
* #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t such that #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg)
* is true).
*
* \return The length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
* \return 0 if \p alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
* MAC algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \
(((mac_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> CY_P64_PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET)
/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher
*
* \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases.
* A more secure mode, such as #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x02c00001)
/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CMAC ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x02c00002)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \
(((alg) & (CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x02c00000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x00800000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000)
/** \endcond */
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher.
*
* A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages
* by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated
* from a key.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \
(((alg) & (CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG))
/** The ARC4 stream cipher algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ARC4 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04800001)
/** The ChaCha20 stream cipher.
*
* ChaCha20 is defined in RFC 7539.
*
* The nonce size for psa_cipher_set_iv() or psa_cipher_generate_iv()
* must be 12.
*
* The initial block counter is always 0.
*
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04800005)
/** The CTR stream cipher mode.
*
* CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher.
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
* For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with
* a key of type #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes).
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CTR ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04c00001)
/** The CFB stream cipher mode.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CFB ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04c00002)
/** The OFB stream cipher mode.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_OFB ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04c00003)
/** The XTS cipher mode.
*
* XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at
* least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input
* does not need to be a whole number of blocks.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XTS ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x044000ff)
/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*
* This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths
* are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04600100)
/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*
* This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) &sect;10.3.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x04600101)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on
* a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \
(((alg) & (CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG))
/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CCM ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x06401001)
/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_GCM ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x06401002)
/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
*
* The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539.
*
* Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces,
* and should reject other sizes.
*
* Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x06001005)
/** In the encoding of a AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to
* CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag.
* The constants for default lengths follow this encoding.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x00003f00)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 8
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000)
/** \endcond */
/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm.
*
* A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD
* algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes.
* Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation
* of the ciphertext.
*
* \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
* #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t such that #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg)
* is true).
* \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes.
*
* \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified
* length.
* \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
* AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid
* for the specified AEAD algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg, tag_length) \
(((aead_alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) | \
((tag_length) << CY_P64_PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK))
/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length.
*
* \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default
* tag length for that algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \
( \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CCM) \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, CY_P64_PSA_ALG_GCM) \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \
0)
/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg, 0) == \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(ref, 0) ? \
ref :
/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing.
*
* This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
*
* The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by
* RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), &sect;9.2
* steps 3&ndash;6.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x10020000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x10030000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \
(((alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \
(((alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x10060000)
/** \endcond */
/** RSA PSS signature with hashing.
*
* This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
* RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with
* a salt length equal to the length of the hash. The specified
* hash algorithm is used to hash the input message, to create the
* salted hash, and for the mask generation.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** ECDSA signature with hashing.
*
* This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62,
* with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
*
* The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of
* the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
* *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length
* of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented
* in big-endian order (most significant octet first).
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** ECDSA signature without hashing.
*
* This is the same signature scheme as #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but
* without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be
* used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an
* already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with
* zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit
* the curve size.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE
/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing.
*
* This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979.
*
* The representation of a signature is the same as with #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA().
*
* Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures
* made with randomized ECDSA (#CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the
* same private key are accepted. In other words,
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature
* algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x10070000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x00010000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \
(((alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
/** \endcond */
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm.
*
* Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms
* structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that
* does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the
* hash value and the key.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg))
/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
*
* A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
* composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use
* the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing
* phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message
* itself.
*
* \param alg A signature algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true).
*
* \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign
* algorithm.
* \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not
* follow the hash-and-sign structure.
* \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or
* if it is not supported by the implementation.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \
((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == 0 ? /*"raw" algorithm*/ 0 : \
((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \
0)
/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x12020000)
/** RSA OAEP encryption.
*
* This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
* RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1.
*
* \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use
* for MGF1.
*
* \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x12030000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \
(((alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \
((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \
0)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x20000100)
/** \endcond */
/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.
*
* For example, `CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HKDF(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
* It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step.
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.
* You must pass #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
* You may pass #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after setup and before
* starting to generate output.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm.
*
* HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash
* function and the HMAC construction.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \
(((alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE)
/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
*
* TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule,
* specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be
* used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
* passed in the order given here:
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
*
* For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the
* concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random,
* and the label is "key expansion".
*
* For example, `CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the
* TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \
(((alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x20000200)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x20000300)
/** \endcond */
/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm.
*
* In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived
* from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding
* (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5).
* The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256
* or SHA-384.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
* passed in the order given here:
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
* - #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
*
* For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is
* forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the
* ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random,
* and the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret".
*
* For example, `CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the
* TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \
(((alg) & ~CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x0803ffff)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x10fc0000)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \
(((alg) & CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \
((CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)))
/** \endcond */
/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with
* a key derivation.
*
* \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such
* that #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true).
* \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_XXX value such
* that #CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation
* algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported
* key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a
* supported key derivation algorithm.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \
((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm.
*
* A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify
* a key derivation function.
* Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with
* a \c CY_P64_PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are
* constructed with CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT().
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm.
*
* The shared secret produced by key agreement is
* `g^{ab}` in big-endian format.
* It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p`
* in bits.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_FFDH ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x30100000)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
*
* This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
* finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
* algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key agreement algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_FFDH)
/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm.
*
* The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of
* the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where
* `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the
* order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8,
* the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret
* is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian
* or big-endian depending on the curve type.
*
* - For Montgomery curves (curve types `CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`),
* the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
* in little-endian byte order.
* The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519.
* - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types
* `CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`),
* the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
* in big-endian byte order.
* The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`.
* - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types
* `CY_P64_PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`),
* the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
* in big-endian byte order.
* The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDH ((cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t)0x30200000)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
* algorithm.
*
* This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
* elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
* algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
* 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key agreement algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ECDH)
/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.
*
* Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in
* a policy, not to perform an operation.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #cy_p64_psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding.
* \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for
* an operation).
* \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \
(CY_P64_PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \
CY_P64_PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \
(alg) == CY_P64_PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
/**@}*/
/** \addtogroup key_lifetimes
* @{
*/
/** The default lifetime for volatile keys.
*
* A volatile key only exists as long as the handle to it is not closed.
* The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset.
*
* A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the
* PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice.
* If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory,
* it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the
* key material if the calling application terminates.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((cy_p64_psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000000)
/** The default lifetime for persistent keys.
*
* A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or
* until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does
* not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but implementations may
* provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset,
* to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application).
*
* This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling
* application. Implementations may offer other storage areas designated
* by other lifetime values as implementation-specific extensions.
* See ::cy_p64_psa_key_lifetime_t for more information.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((cy_p64_psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000001)
/** The persistence level of volatile keys.
*
* See ::cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t)0x00)
/** The default persistence level for persistent keys.
*
* See ::cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t)0x01)
/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed.
*
* See ::cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t)0xff)
/** See ::cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \
((cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t)((lifetime) & 0x000000ff))
/** See ::cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \
((cy_p64_psa_key_location_t)((lifetime) >> 8))
/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile.
*
* A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when
* the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key
* is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.
*
* A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are
* preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an
* implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example,
* a factory reset).
*
* \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type
* ::cy_p64_psa_key_lifetime_t).
*
* \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \
(CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
CY_P64_PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)
/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location.
*
* \param persistence The persistence level
* (value of type ::cy_p64_psa_key_persistence_t).
* \param location The location indicator
* (value of type ::cy_p64_psa_key_location_t).
*
* \return The constructed lifetime value.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \
((location) << 8 | (persistence))
/** The local storage area for persistent keys.
*
* This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent
* keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor.
*
* See ::cy_p64_psa_key_location_t for more information.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((cy_p64_psa_key_location_t)0x000000)
/** \cond INTERNAL */
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((cy_p64_psa_key_location_t)0x800000)
/** \endcond */
/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((cy_p64_psa_app_key_id_t)0x00000001)
/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((cy_p64_psa_app_key_id_t)0x3fffffff)
/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((cy_p64_psa_app_key_id_t)0x40000000)
/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((cy_p64_psa_app_key_id_t)0x7fffffff)
/**@}*/
/** \addtogroup policy
* @{
*/
/** Whether the key may be exported.
*
* A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported
* regardless of the value of this permission flag.
*
* If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not
* allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor,
* whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface.
* The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form
* where it is encrypted by another key.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((cy_p64_psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001)
/** Whether the key may be copied.
*
* This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key
* with the same policy or a more restrictive policy.
*
* For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which
* enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure
* element also requires the usage flag #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.
* Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just
* #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it.
* For keys with the lifetime #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or
* #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY
* is sufficient to permit the copy.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((cy_p64_psa_key_usage_t)0x00000002)
/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation,
* for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation,
* or for an asymmetric encryption operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((cy_p64_psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100)
/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation,
* for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation,
* or for an asymmetric decryption operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((cy_p64_psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200)
/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation
* or for an asymmetric signature operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((cy_p64_psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400)
/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation
* or for an asymmetric signature verification operation,
* if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((cy_p64_psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800)
/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((cy_p64_psa_key_usage_t)0x00001000)
/**@}*/
/** \addtogroup key_derivation
* @{
*/
/** A secret input for key derivation.
*
* This should be a key of type #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE
* (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key())
* or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement
* (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()).
*
* The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
* key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
* may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
* psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), not psa_key_derivation_output_key().
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((cy_p64_psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101)
/** A label for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((cy_p64_psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201)
/** A salt for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((cy_p64_psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202)
/** An information string for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((cy_p64_psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203)
/** A seed for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #CY_P64_PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
*/
#define CY_P64_PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((cy_p64_psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0204)
/**@}*/
#endif /* CY_P64_CY_P64_PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */